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Article 
Innovation Nationalism 
SAPNA KUMAR 
Nationalism has experienced a global resurgence, with many world leaders 
advocating a return to a glorious, and often illusory, past. In the United States, 
economic nationalism has received support from Democrats and Republicans alike, 
fueled by growing public backlash to free trade. These changes are having a major 
impact on U.S. patent policy. Over the past several decades, the government has 
cultivated an identity of the United States as being an innovative country. It has 
implemented patent policies that reinforced this identity, such as strengthening 
domestic patent rights and requiring trading partners to adopt U.S.-style patent and 
intellectual property laws. Many times, these policies have negative consequences, 
such as forcing U.S. consumers to subsidize chosen industries through paying 
higher prices for goods. This innovation-driven approach to economic nationalism, 
however, is changing under the Trump administration. President Trump has chosen 
to advance a national identity of nativism and cultural traditionalism, in which 
foreign people and foreign ideas are viewed with disdain. With regard to economic 
policy, he has embraced a strong sovereign model of governance, implementing 
protectionist import tariffs and threatening unilateral trade sanctions against 
China. This Article looks to political science and international political economy 
research to understand what economic nationalism is and how U.S. patent policy 
helps advance it. It looks at the emergence of innovation nationalism under prior 
administrations and examines how shifting national identity under the Trump 
administration is impacting it. 
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Innovation Nationalism 
SAPNA KUMAR * 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, a global wave of nationalism has arrived. World 
leaders have sought to elevate the interests of their respective countries 
above all others, promising to take control against hostile foreigners who 
they claim are responsible for national decline.1 Governments from 
countries such as Russia, Turkey, and India have comingled nationalism 
with nostalgia, advocating a return to a glorious—and often illusory—past.2 
In particular, economic nationalism has experienced a surge in popularity. 
Although economists generally agree that free trade is beneficial overall, it 
can exacerbate domestic inequality by facilitating job offshoring and 
disproportionately hurting workers in certain industries.3  
In the United States, support for economic nationalism is steadily 
increasing and has been, to some degree, bipartisan.4 Among the Democrats, 
                                                                                                                     
* Law Foundation Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Information Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author would like to thank Anupam Chander, 
Kathleen Claussen, Camilla Hrdy, and Sarah Wasserman Rajec for their helpful comments, as well as 
the participants of the Akron Law IP Scholars Forum, the AALS Annual Conference, the University of 
Houston Law Center Works-In-Progress Roundtable, the 2018 Works-In-Progress Intellectual Property 
Colloquium, and the 2018 ATRIP Congress. She would also like to thank University of Houston Law 
Center research librarians Dan Donahue, Christopher Dykes, and Robert Clark for their tireless efforts in 
tracking down sources. 
1 See League of Nationalists, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2016, at 63 (discussing the roots of 
nationalism); Thomas Hale & David Held, Why is the Anti-Global Backlash Happening Now?, WORLD 
ECON. F. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/anti-globalization-brexit-
backlash-nationalism-control/ (discussing how several global leaders have blamed “hostile foreign forces 
for national decline, real or perceived” and “have promised to ‘take back control’ to make their country 
great again”). 
2 See Gideon Rachman, Opinion, Trump, Putin, Xi and the Rise of Nostalgic Nationalism, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/198efe76-ce8b-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1?mhq5j=e1 
(discussing how many world leaders have invoked “nostalgic nationalism,” including the United States, 
Turkey, Russia, China, Japan, and India).  
3 See Michael Hirsh, Why the New Nationalists Are Taking Over, POLITICO (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris-johnson-brexit-
foreign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995 (observing that although free trade helped increase 
equality between countries, this came “at the cost of creating more inequality within countries” and led 
to backlash). 
4 See Fitch: Economic Nationalism and Fiscal Reflation Dominate 2017 Global Economic Outlook, 
FITCH RATINGS (Nov. 29, 2016, 2:59 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1015433 (discussing the 
long-term growth of economic protectionism); Jack M. Mintz, Steve Bannon May Be Gone, But 
Economic Nationalism Is Here to Stay, FIN. POST (Aug. 23, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
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President Obama initially supported a “Buy American” provision for 
government-funded projects.5 He further called for “economic patriotism” 
through the payment of corporate taxes and criticized businesses for 
“renouncing their citizenship” to avoid paying them.6 During the 2016 
election, Vermont senator Bernie Sanders spoke out sharply against free 
trade agreements, which he maintained enriched corporations at the expense 
of U.S. workers.7 This trend has now accelerated under President Trump, 
who has tapped into a growing backlash against free trade agreements and 
has implemented protectionist trade policies to support an “America First” 
agenda.8  
The U.S. patent system is intertwined with economic nationalism, 
beyond simple protectionism.9 For the past several decades, the government 
has actively promoted a national identity of innovativeness and tied it to the 
U.S. intellectual property (IP) system—particularly to patents.10 Because 
patent law is not subject to the high degree of harmonization that exists for 
copyrights and trademarks,11 the U.S. government can formulate domestic 
                                                                                                                     
http://business.financialpost.com/opinion/steve-bannon-may-be-gone-but-economic-nationalism-is-
here-to-stay (discussing the bipartisan U.S. support for economic nationalism). 
5 See Carol E. Lee, Obama Backs Off “Buy American”, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2009, 4:48 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2009/02/obama-backs-off-buy-american-018809 (discussing Obama’s 
initial support for “Buy American” legislation).  
6 Jeff Mason, Obama Rails Against Corporate Maneuver to Evade U.S. Taxes, REUTERS (July 25, 
2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-obama-inversions-
idUSKBN0FT13K20140725. 
7 John Brinkley, Bernie Sanders’ Claim That Free Trade Agreements Cost ‘Millions’ of Jobs Is 
Unsupported by Facts, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2016), https://medium.com/@johnb505/bernie-sanders-claim-
that-free-trade-agreements-cost-millions-of-jobs-is-unsupported-by-facts-6d0b2cc7b648 (quoting 
Bernie Sanders as saying that free trade agreements like NAFTA “resulted in the loss of millions of 
decent-paying jobs, 60,000 factories in America lost since 2001, millions of decent-paying jobs”). 
8 See Tobias Konitzer et al., Who Cares About Free Trade? Not Many Americans, It Turns Out, 
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/07/29/who-cares-about-free-trade/ (finding that of the 33% of Americans who have strong 
feelings about free trade, more than 75% are opposed to it). In a 2006 survey by the Pew Research Center, 
43% of Republicans and 30% of Democrats said that free trade agreements helped their families. Ten 
years later, a survey by Politico and the Harvard School of Public Health showed that 33% of Democrats 
viewed free trade as helping their community while only 18% of Republicans did. HARVARD T.H. CHAN 
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & POLITICO, AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON CURRENT TRADE AND HEALTH POLICIES 2, 
4 (Sept. 2016), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/2016/10/POLITICO-Harvard-
Poll-Sept-2016-Trade-and-Health.pdf. 
9 Several scholars have observed how patents can be protectionist. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently 
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 63, 98 (2008) (maintaining that the international trade commission is not biased against 
defendants in litigation under § 337 of the Tariff Act); William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 
FLA. L. REV. 341, 359–63 (2013) (discussing historical protectionism in U.S. patent law and observing 
that TRIPS now limits the ability to implement protectionist patent laws). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 109–11 
(2017) (discussing how patent law is the least harmonized of all major forms of intellectual property, 
leading to comity concerns in enforcing domestic patent laws extraterritorially). 
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patent law to protect its strongest industries, such as pharmaceutical drug 
manufacturing. Such rights can function as a government subsidy, with the 
public artificially supporting chosen industries, thereby disadvantaging 
other countries.12 Furthermore, in formulating trade agreements, the United 
States frequently requires other countries to adopt strong patent and 
intellectual property (IP) rights, in exchange for trade concessions.13 This is 
often harmful for developing countries, which lack sufficient infrastructure 
to benefit from the increased IP protection. Countries that fail to offer strong 
patent rights are punished with various sanctions, even if such laws are not 
in their best interest.14  
This innovation nationalism approach is now coming into conflict with 
Trump’s policies. Trump has promoted a nativist and culturally traditionalist 
strain of nationalism, in which foreign people and ideas are viewed as a 
threat to traditional values.15 In putting “America First,” Trump has rejected 
cooperation with foreign powers. He removed the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have provided benefits to 
U.S. companies seeking foreign patent protection. He furthermore has 
eschewed using the World Trade Organization for IP dispute resolution in 
favor of using § 301 of the Trade Act and has dramatically increased tariffs 
on imported goods. In using such powerful unilateral measures against 
countries that infringe U.S. patent rights, Trump risks entering the United 
States into a full-blown trade war. 
This Article uses economic nationalism theory as a lens for better 
understanding U.S. patent policy. Part I looks to research in the fields of 
political science and political international economy to examine nationalism 
and economic nationalism. It further discusses the rise and fall of U.S. free 
trade and the growth of economically nationalistic policies. Part II examines 
how innovation and patents became linked, and how all three branches of 
government advanced this idea prior to the Trump administration. It 
maintains that part of the United States’ national identity has been its status 
                                                                                                                     
12 See infra Part III.A. 
13 See Josef Drexl, The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of 
Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 53, 63 
(Hans Ullrich et al. eds., 2016) (discussing how trade concessions are used in exchange for higher IP 
standards); J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round: Competitive 
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 255–58 (1993) (predicting that updates to the TRIPS agreement would lead to 
countries offering trade concessions in exchange for greater intellectual property protection). 
14 See infra Part III.B. 
15 See infra Part I.B.2; see also MATT GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: 
IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 219 (2016) (discussing Trump’s appeal 
to cultural traditionalism); Scott Winship, Trumpism: ‘It’s the Culture, Stupid’, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 15, 
2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/432822/donald-trump-culture-not-economy-
explains-his-appeal (discussing Trump’s appeal among nativists that are uneasy with rapid cultural 
change and perceived decline). 
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as an innovative country, coupled with the belief that innovation helps the 
United States maintain its dominance in the world. Part III then examines 
how prior administrations implemented patent-related economic policy in an 
attempt to reinforce this innovation identity and explores how the Trump 
administration has come into conflict with it.  
I. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Economic nationalism is often viewed as synonymous with protectionist 
policies, such as levying tariffs on imported goods or providing subsidies to 
national industries.16 But the term encompasses far more, extending to any 
economic policy made to advance a shared national identity that exists 
independent of race and religion.  
A. Overview of Nationalism and Economic Nationalism 
1. Introduction to Nationalism 
To understand nationalism, one must first understand nations and 
national identity. A nation is a collective of people united in a belief of a 
territorial right to self-determination.17 Within a nation, national identity 
operates at both individual and collective levels.18 For individuals, “national 
identity” refers to one’s sense of belonging to a nation.19 The term also refers 
to collective beliefs that unite members of a nation, including language, 
religion, or ethnicity.20  
Definitions for nationalism vary across disciplines. For example, 
philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner described it as a 
“principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent.”21 Other scholars view nationalism as an economic policy, a 
manufactured linguistic identity, or an ideology of solidarity.22 
In political science, a key attribute of nationalism relates to membership 
of nations. Once the territorial boundaries for a nation have been 
                                                                                                                     
16 See, e.g., Max Fisher, Bannon’s Vision for a ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, at A13 (providing the “formal[]” definition of economic nationalism “as 
encompassing domestic control of the economy, protectionist policies such as tariffs and opposition to 
trade and immigration”). 
17 Lowell W. Barrington, “Nation” and “Nationalism”: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political 
Science, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 712, 712–13 (1997). 
18 RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1, 24 (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. 
2001) (discussing the two levels of national identity). 
19 Id. at 24. 
20 Id. at 24–26. 
21 ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (1983).  
22 See Ernst B. Haas, What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?, 40 INT’L ORG. 707, 707–
08 (1986) (discussing definitions of nationalism given by economists, political scientists, and 
sociologists). 
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established,23 nationalism defines the membership and identity of the group 
that comprises the nation.24 A collective national identity is utilized for 
political, economic, and cultural purposes.25 Importantly, nationalism is the 
creation of a shared national identity independent of language, race, religion, 
and economic status.26 Gellner described nationalism as transition to a “high 
culture” that supersedes the “little culture” of religion and ethnic identity.27  
The government plays a key role in shaping national identity,28 such as 
by regulating what is taught in the public education system, by using shared 
symbols such as flags and national anthems, and by celebrating those 
deemed national heroes.29 For example, Singapore uses compulsory military 
service to create cohesive identity and the United Kingdom’s monarchy  
promotes British values.30 In the United States, the President influences 
national identity by making foreign policy decisions that unite the country 
                                                                                                                     
23 Barrington, supra note 17, at 714. 
24 See Christophe Jaffrelot, For a Theory of Nationalism, in REVISITING NATIONALISM: THEORIES 
AND PROCESSES 11 (Alain Dieckhoff & Christophe Jaffrelot eds., 2005) (describing nationalism as “an 
ideology . . . which often claims the control of a nation and/or promotes one’s own identity against 
Others” and as being “rooted in identity politics”); Barrington, supra note 17, at 714 (describing how 
differing definitions of the term “nationalism” among political scientists generally share a feature of 
defining the membership of the group that comprises the nation). 
Note that scholars are divided with regard to whether the study of the formation of nations is part 
of nationalism. Compare Barrington, supra note 17, at 712 (maintaining that the study of the nation is an 
integral part of nationalism) with Jaffrelot, supra note 24 at 11 (arguing that “to construct a theory of the 
nation and to evolve one of nationalism are not the same thing”). 
25 See ABDELAL, supra note 18, at 25–26 (discussing how national identity shapes the symbol of 
the nation, which in turn is used to advance political, economic, and cultural goals). 
26 See GELLNER, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that nationalism requires that “ethnic boundaries should 
not cut across political ones”); Haas, supra note 22, at 709 (describing nationalism as “the convergence 
of territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” such as race, religion, and 
profession). 
27 GELLNER, supra note 21, at 35–38, 142. This transition occurs, according to Gellner, through 
literacy and education. Id. 
28 See Alain Dieckhoff, Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and Political Nationalism 
Revisited, in REVISITING NATIONALISM: THEORIES AND PROCESSES 66 (Alain Dieckhoff & Christophe 
Jaffrelot eds., 2005) (discussing how “the state is a particularly zealous creator of nationalism,” with its 
political, social, and cultural elites working to “reinforce national cohesion”). 
29 See GELLNER, supra note 21, at 35–38 (discussing the role of education in propagating a shared 
high culture); Dieckhoff, supra note 28, at 66 (discussing how elites use the military, school system, and 
literature to reinforce cohesion and “exalt the specificity, originality and glory of the nation”); Frederick 
Solt, Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride, 73 J. POL. 
821, 821 (2011) (discussing the tools that governments use to instill nationalism).  
30 For example, an authoritarian country like Singapore can use strong government control to shape 
national identity. See, e.g., Stephan Ortmann, Singapore: The Politics of Inventing National Identity, 28 
J. CURRENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF. 23, 28, 31–32 (2009) (discussing the ways in which Singapore uses 
state action to promote national identity).  
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against an enemy31 and by choosing which groups to include or exclude in 
society.32  
Nationalism is a double-edged sword. At its best, it can help create 
cohesion and foster social harmony,33 binding complete strangers together 
to help those that are less fortunate.34 For example, civic nationalism can be 
used to build an identity around shared liberal principles—such as 
democracy, social justice, and autonomy—with membership open to any 
individual who shares such values.35 This form of nationalism played a 
prominent role in the United States in the 1990s, with some scholars 
describing it as a push for multiculturalism and others viewing it as a melting 
pot.36  
At its worst, nationalism creates a feeling of superiority among citizens 
over other countries and a disdain for anything foreign.37 As former 
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich noted, nationalism can lead to a zero-sum 
game in which the public supports policies that only marginally improve the 
country’s welfare while harming everyone else and forcing other countries 
to retaliate.38 It can furthermore be used to bind the country around a chosen 
                                                                                                                     
31 See VANESSA B. BEASLEY, YOU, THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PRESIDENTIAL 
RHETORIC 63 (2004) (discussing how U.S. presidents use civil religious themes to shape national 
identity); OLE R. HOLSTI, TO SEE OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US: HOW PUBLICS ABROAD VIEW THE 
UNITED STATES AFTER 9/11 21–22 (2008) (discussing how President George W. Bush labeled countries 
as enemies to unite the country); ROSS POOL, NATION AND IDENTITY 15 (1999) (acknowledging that 
cultural differences in a country can be overcome by “the existence of a common enemy”). 
32 See BEASLEY, supra note 31, at 64–65 (discussing how the presidential rhetoric of shared beliefs 
needs opposition for the country to rally against); MARY E. STUCKEY, DEFINING AMERICANS: THE 
PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 2, 19–20 (2004) (discussing how the president articulates national 
identity, including by communicating which groups are included or excluded); Kevin Coe & Rico 
Neumann, Finding Foreigners in American National Identity: Presidential Discourse, People, and the 
International Community, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 819, 820–21 (2011) (observing that “presidents assign 
different groups of Americans to different sociopolitical roles”);. 
33 See Haas, supra note 22, at 709 (defining nationalism as “the convergence of territorial and 
political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” and observing that nationalism “stresses the 
individual’s search for identity with strangers in an impersonal world”). 
34 See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY 
CAPITALISM 304–05 (1992) (observing how nationalism can motivate people to help the less fortunate). 
35 See Anna Stilz, Civic Nationalism and Language Policy, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257, 257 (2009) 
(describing how “civic nations” are based on a commitment to uphold political institutions and accept 
shared liberal principles underlying them); Kok-Chor Tan, Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan 
Justice, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 431, 432 (2002) (discussing how liberal nationalism 
promotes core values of “individual autonomy, social justice and democracy”).  
36 See NOAH PICKUS, TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE: IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CIVIC 
NATIONALISM 147–50, (Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (discussing how civic nationalism is “based on 
neither racial nor religious superiority” and distinguishing liberal and conservative views of it). 
37 See Solt, supra note 29, at 824 (discussing how nationalism “is often associated with belief in 
national superiority and hostility to outsiders,” but maintaining that nationalism is distinct from 
xenophobia); REICH, supra note 34, at 305 (discussing how nationalism “can easily degenerate into 
jingoistic contempt for all things foreign”). 
38 REICH, supra note 34, at 306. 
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enemy and to restrict individual rights.39 Nationalism can also be used to 
divert the public’s attention from more significant problems, such as 
economic inequality.40 
2. Introduction to Economic Nationalism 
“Economic nationalism” is often simplistically defined as economic 
policies that discriminate in favor of one’s own country.41 Scholars42 and the 
media43 commonly use the term as though it were synonymous with 
protectionism, given that protectionist policies are often an important tool 
for advancing an economically nationalistic agenda. Pro-free-trade 
economists sometimes used the term pejoratively to discount anti-liberal 
trends, without exploring why it persists.44  
                                                                                                                     
39 Martin Wolf, The Economic Peril of Aggrieved Nationalism, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017, 11:11 
AM), https://www.ft.com/content/5c7c6a26-db0a-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce (discussing how 
nationalistic leaders distinguish “‘real’ people” from “enemies of the people” and use this to justify the 
move towards “plebiscitary dictatorship” through the cultivation of paranoia). For example, in Turkey, 
Recep Erdogan successfully convinced citizens to grant him more power and abrogated civil rights while 
uniting the country against various enemies. See Carlotta Gall, Erdogan’s Victory in Turkey Election 
Expands His Powers, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html (reporting that 
Turkish voters granted President Erdogan “vastly expanded authority over the legislature and judiciary” 
in national elections).  
40 See Solt, supra note 29, at 828 (arguing that countries use nationalism to divert the public’s 
attention away from economic inequality). 
41 See, e.g., C. Christopher Baughn & Attila Yaprak, Economic Nationalism: Conceptual and 
Empirical Development, 17 POL. PSYCHOL. 759, 760 (1996) (defining “economic nationalism” as 
“discrimination in favor of one’s own nation, carried on as a matter of policy”); Sam Pryke, Economic 
Nationalism: Theory, History, and Prospects, 3 GLOBAL POL’Y 281, 285 (2012) (arguing that the term 
“economic nationalism” should be limited to “practices designed to create, bolster and protect national 
economies in the context of world markets”). 
42 See Baughn & Yaprak, supra note 41, at 760 (observing that economists often equate the 
economic practices and policies for economic nationalism); Andreas Pickel, Explaining, and Explaining 
with, Economic Nationalism, 9 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 105, 106 (2003) (discussing that economic 
nationalism can be understood narrowly to encompass a particular ideology, such as protectionism).  
43 See Stuart Anderson, Economists Say ‘Economic Nationalism’ is Economic Nonsense, FORBES 
(Feb. 25, 2017, 2:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2017/02/25/economists-say-
economic-nationalism-is-economic-nonsense/#1f8abeab306f (referring to economic nationalism as “a 
set of political arguments aimed at blaming foreigners for America’s problems”); George Friedman & 
Allison Fedirka, America’s Rise of Nationalism Has it Barreling Towards a Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 
18, 2017, 6:02 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-headed-to-a-pivotal-socio-economic-
crisis-2017-1 (maintaining that “[p]rotectionism—economic nationalism—has gained speed”). 
44 See Pickel, supra note 42, at 107–08 (observing that “[n]eo-liberal discourse treats economic 
nationalism as a pernicious doctrine, and its proponents as the political enemy” with the term being used 
pejoratively); Eric Helleiner, Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons 
from the 19th Century, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 307, 309 (2002) [hereinafter Helleiner, Economic Nationalism 
as a Challenge] (observing that after World War II, liberal economists used the term “to discredit and 
attack policies with which they disagreed”); George T. Crane, Economic Nationalism: Bringing the 
Nation Back In, 27 J. INT’L STUD. 55, 58 (1998) (discussing how liberal economists view economic 
nationalism as a “pathology” that misunderstands the power of the free market). 
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However, beginning in the 1990s, this limited view of economic 
nationalism was called into question, with scholars seeking to decouple it 
from protectionism.45 As political scientists and international political 
economists have observed, economic nationalism is far more than a “thin” 
view that focuses solely on economic policy.46 Eric Helleiner has argued that 
defining nationalism solely through protectionist trade policies neglects the 
“nationalist content of economic nationalism.”47 Common or shared values 
create a national identity that gives rise to specific economic policies, such 
as protectionism.48 Shared negative economic experiences, such as 
recessions, can shape national identity as well.49  
In this regard, economic nationalism is not synonymous with or limited 
to protectionist policies.50 Andreas Pickel has noted that viewing economic 
nationalism “exclusively as ideology or policy doctrine” imposes too rigid a 
limit on understanding the relationship between national identity and 
political economy.51 And as Helleiner has argued, free-trade policies can be 
made under the auspices of economic nationalism by being “associated with 
national prestige” or linked to projects that are designed to strengthen 
national identity.52  
                                                                                                                     
45 See Pryke, supra note 41, at 283 (discussing the “major reconsideration of economic nationalism” 
that reevaluated the idea that economic nationalism is a protectionist policy); Crane, supra note 44, at 55 
(observing that discussions regarding economic nationalism “tend to ignore the variability and 
malleability of particular definitions of national identity”). 
46 See Pickel, supra note 42, at 114 (criticizing the conventional view of economic nationalism that 
is based on the “thin” view of economics which disregards other phenomena, like national identity); 
George T. Crane, Imagining the Economic Nation: Globalisation in China, 4 NEW POL. ECON. 215, 215 
(1999) (maintaining that economic nationalism should be viewed as a “facet of national identity”). 
47 Eric Helleiner, Conclusion: The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Economic 
Nationalism, in ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 220, 221 (Eric Helleiner & 
Andreas Pickel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Helleiner, Meaning and Contemporary Significance]. 
48 Id. at 225 (observing that economic nationalism is associated with core nationalistic values, such 
as commitment to sovereignty); RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: POST-
SOVIET STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 33 (2001) (defining economic nationalism as “a set of 
policies that results from a shared national identity, or from the predominance of a specific nationalism 
in the politics of a state”); Andreas Pickel, Introduction to ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 1, 11 (Eric Helleiner & Andreas Pickel eds., 2005) (maintaining that economic nationalism 
should be understood as “typical relationships between national identity and economy”). 
49 See Crane, Economic Nationalism, supra note 44, at 68–69 (discussing how “memories of 
common economic experiences are of some importance in the construction of national identity” and how 
“perceived injustices in economic policy” played a role in the American Revolution).  
50 See id. at 74 (“Economic nationalism is expressed in many different forms beyond trade 
protectionism and industrial policy”); Pickel, supra note 48, at 12 (maintaining that “the concept of 
economic nationalism need not be restricted to specific policy doctrines but rather should be viewed more 
generically”). 
51 Pickel, supra note 48, at 13. 
52 Helleiner, Economic Nationalism as a Challenge, supra note 44, at 322–23; see also Stephen 
Shulman, Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 365, 370 (2000) 
(observing that “the development of extensive foreign ties between a minority nation and foreign states 
is a form of economic diversification that reduces the nation’s vulnerability to the ruling majority or 
minority nation”). 
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Treating protectionist policies as mere pathologies misses why 
protectionism has such strong staying power.53 Economists widely agree that 
free trade is beneficial.54 In an open letter signed by fourteen economists 
who led the President’s Council of Economic Advisors under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, the group maintained that 
“[i]nternational trade is fundamentally good for the U.S. economy, 
beneficial to American families over time, and consonant with our domestic 
priorities.”55 Yet, notwithstanding this broad consensus from both sides of 
the political aisle, protectionist policies continue to be popular with the U.S. 
government and the public.56 
Detrimental economic policies may continue to thrive because they 
advance a shared national identity.57 Protectionism can go hand-in-hand with 
an identity that values strong sovereignty and views foreign people or ideas 
as dangerous.58 This can be coupled with advancing “economic patriotism,” 
in which people and businesses are exhorted to ignore their own economic 
self-interests and buy pricier domestically produced goods.59 Consequently, 
even though protectionist policies are ultimately economically destructive, 
they persist to the extent that they support national identity.  
                                                                                                                     
53 Crane, supra note 44,  at 58–59. 
54 See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988) (discussing the advantages of free 
trade); see infra Part I.B.1; see also N. Gregory Mankiw, Economists Actually Agree on This: The 
Wisdom of Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-
free-trade.html (discussing the broad consensus among economists that free trade is beneficial).   
55 An Open Letter, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2015/03/an-open-letter.html. 
56 See Jude Sheerin, What Trump Has in Common with Abe Lincoln and Ferris Bueller, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43336529 (discussing the historical 
popularity of protectionist policies and how President Donald Trump “raising the economic drawbridge 
is thoroughly in keeping with his party’s historical roots”). 
57 See Crane, supra note 44, at 74–75 (providing examples from various Asian countries of 
economic policies being used to promote national identity). 
58 See ABDELAL, supra note 48, at 2 (observing that nationalism-based proposals “lead governments 
to interpret their economic dependence on some states as a security threat but on other states as mutually 
beneficial exchange”); Hidde Bekhuis et al., Globalization and Support for National Cultural 
Protectionism from a Cross-National Perspective, 29 EURO. SOCIO. REV. 1040, 1040 (2012) (proposing 
“that globalization processes affect people’s support of cultural protectionism, both by a diversification 
view on globalization . . . and by a nationalistic interpretation, that is, a threat to the nation and rising 
nationalism”). 
59 See Ben Clift & Cornelia Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control over Open Markets, 
19 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 307, 314 (2012) (observing that “economic patriotism” suggests ranking 
homeland above individual economic interests). Interestingly, patriotism and nationalism are generally 
viewed as distinct. See Daniel Druckman, Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social 
Psychological Perspective, 38 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 43, 63–64 (1994) (observing that although 
patriotism appears “to lead to strong attachments and loyalty to one’s own group without the 
corresponding hostility toward other groups,” nationalism is coupled with disliking other groups). 
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B. The Historical Development of Economic Nationalism in the United 
States  
1. Twentieth Century Trade Liberalization 
In the early twentieth century, tariffs and protectionist policies were the 
norm. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 193060 imposed record-high tariffs 
on many classes of imported goods, with the average rate on dutiable imports 
hitting fifty-three percent—a rise of thirteen percentage points in only three 
years.61 Although the primary objective of the tariffs was to help U.S. 
industries compete, at least some of them were designed to hurt Europe and 
suppress demand for products that were only available from foreign 
sources.62 This led to retaliatory tariffs against the United States and caused 
global trade to contract.63 As political scientist Elmer Schattschneider 
observed, the Tariff Act was largely drafted by a multitude of well-organized 
interest groups that sought to advance their own narrow agendas.64 It 
crippled international trade and is believed by some scholars to have 
deepened the Great Depression.65  
A shift in U.S. trade policy began in the aftermath of World War II. U.S. 
and British delegates proposed the creation of an economic and financial 
plan for post-War reconstruction, including proposals for the creation of the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.66 In 1947, the United States 
and twenty-two other countries signed the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs 
                                                                                                                     
60 Smoot-Hawley Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1202–1683g (2012)). 
61 See Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process, 
Problems, and Progress, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 139–40 (1994) (“The [Hawley-Smoot Tariff] [A]ct 
imposed fifty-three percent . . . duties on imports in order to stimulate Depression-era industries and send 
a message to protectionist European states.”); Catherine L. Mann, Protection and Retaliation: Changing 
the ‘Rules of the Game’, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 311, 312 (“Tariffs were increased 
on thousands of products, with the average tariff rate on dutiable imports rising 13 percentage points to 
53 percent from 1929 to 1931.”).  
62 See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 20 (“The Great Depression had been associated with beggar-
my-neighbor policies of competitive exchange-rate depreciation and tariff escalation, each aimed at 
preserving and deflecting aggregate demand toward one’s own industries at the expense of those of one’s 
trading partners.”); Mann, supra note 61, at 326 (discussing the “1,000 percent increase in the tariff on 
cashew nuts”). 
63 Mann, supra note 61, at 327 (discussing retaliatory measures taken by Spain, Italy, and Canada); 
Grant, supra note 61, at 140 (noting that most U.S. trading partners retaliated against the statute). 
64 See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 287–89 (1935) (discussing 
how various interest groups sought common ground in shaping tariffs). 
65 See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 21 (noting that although tariff escalation did not alone cause 
the Depression, it is “arguable” that it deepened it); but see ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA’S 
MARKET 110, 115 (1995) (arguing that although the business and financial industry viewed the tariff 
battle of the 1920s as a “collapse of leadership and discipline in Congress,” which contributed to the 
stock market crash, many factors contributed to the Great Depression). 
66 Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 421, 422 (1998) 
(discussing the proposed Bretton Woods system). 
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in Trade (the GATT).67 The GATT introduced a series of rules to regulate 
trade among member nations, including significant cuts in tariffs.68 
Although never explicitly mentioned, the clear goal was to promote open 
trade.69 Successive rounds of trade negotiation under the GATT provided 
further liberalization.70 President Kennedy asked Congress for increased 
trade authority,71 which led to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962.72 This resulted in the Kennedy Round of the GATT,73 in which tariffs 
were further reduced and other trade barriers were addressed.74  
Beginning in the late 1960s, the United States’ commitment to free trade 
showed signs of uncertainty. In 1967, Congress allowed the President’s 
power to negotiate tariff reductions to expire,75 and Richard Nixon 
implemented protectionist measures in response to the OPEC oil embargo.76 
Under the Trade Act of 1974, trade barriers were again dropped.77 But to 
secure support from protectionist members of Congress, the Trade Act 
transformed the Tariff Commission into the more independent International 
Trade Commission (ITC), and it provided the agency with new powers to 
protect domestic industries from unfair trade.78  
                                                                                                                     
67 CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 11 n.1 (2009). 
68 Id. at 11–12 (noting the GATT “created a new basic template of rules and exceptions to regulate 
international trade between members . . . and locked in initial tariff reductions that these countries 
committed to establish”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 840 (1995) (noting that the GATT was 
originally negotiated “as a provisional trade agreement to lower tariffs”). 
69 Kennedy, supra note 66, at 424 (observing that “the guiding economic premise that underlies the 
entire GATT-WTO system is open trade”). 
70 WTO, The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2018) (“GATT 
helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading system that became more and more liberal 
through rounds of trade negotiations.”). 
71 Bernard Norwood, The Kennedy Round: A Try at Linear Trade Negotiations, 12 J.L. & ECON. 
297, 299 (1969) (discussing how President Kennedy requested Congressional authority to negotiate trade 
agreements reducing U.S. and foreign duties). 
72 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872. The Statement of Purpose 
for the Act included stimulating economic growth and “strengthen[ing] economic relations with foreign 
countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world.” § 102(1)-
(2), 76 Stat. at 872.  
73 Norwood, supra note 71, at 299. 
74 Ann V. Morrison, GATT’s Seven Rounds of Trade Talks Span More Than Thirty Years, BUS. AM. 
10, July 7, 1986.  
75 IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 
(TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 4 (2015) 
76 See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 529, 542 (2009) (discussing the resurgence of trade barriers from 1967 to 1974). 
77 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (“The Congress finds that barriers to (and other 
distortions of) international trade are reducing the growth of foreign markets for the products of the 
United States . . . .”). 
78 See Kumar, supra note 76, at 542–544 (discussing Congress’s transformation of the Tariff 
Commission into the International Trade Commission (ITC) and discussing how Congress granted the 
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In the 1970s and early 1980s, quotas were imposed on steel, 
automobiles, and textiles.79 To dodge obligations under the GATT, the 
United States relied on “voluntary” agreements, which were negotiated with 
various countries to protect the local market for electronics, steel, and other 
products.80 Countries agreed to this only to avoid a more severe quota if they 
refused.81 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, trade liberalization continued.82 After 
groundwork was laid by earlier administrations, the United States entered 
into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) under President 
Clinton.83 NAFTA was far more comprehensive than the GATT—dealing 
with relations among Canada, Mexico, and the United States.84 Although 
NAFTA touched on a wide variety of areas, including intellectual property, 
its greatest impact was on the automotive industry, agriculture, and textile 
manufacturing.85  
While NAFTA was being negotiated, the United States was also 
involved with the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which was finalized in 
April 1994 under the Marrakesh Agreement. This round created the World 
                                                                                                                     
ITC the power to make final decisions regarding exclusion orders and the authority to issue cease-and-
desist orders).  
79 See Robert W. Crandall, The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection for Autos and Steel, 1 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 271, 271 (1987) (noting the protectionist politics in the United States 
between 1979-1985 led to quotas on steel, automobiles, and textiles).  
80 See WILLIAM R. CLINE, Introduction and Summary, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980S 7 (William 
R. Cline ed., 1983) (describing marketing agreements with various Asian countries regarding color 
televisions and negotiated quotas on steel with the European Commission); REICH, supra note 34, at 71 
(discussing the use of voluntary agreements to comply with GATT).  
81 REICH, supra note 34, at 71. 
82 See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 54 (“There was indeed a dramatic conjunction of factors—
drawing on ideology, interests, and institutions—that had clearly driven the engine of trade 
liberalization.”). From the end of World War II to the 1980s, the United States’ average tariff rate had 
fallen to 4.9%—a 92% reduction—notwithstanding a slowdown in trade expansion. Id. at 3, 54. 
83 See William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the North American 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Dec. 12, 1993); PETER HANNAFORD & CHARLES D. HOBBS, 
REMEMBERING REAGAN 144 (Regnery Publ’g, Inc., 1994) (noting that Reagan’s relationship with 
Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney completed the first step in what became the North American 
Free Trade Agreement); Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Bush Signs North American Trade Pact Clinton Says He 
Won’t Renegotiate, BALT. SUN (Dec. 18, 1992),  http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-12-
18/news/1992353055_1_treaty-renegotiate-clinton (discussing Bush signing NAFTA). 
84 Michael W. Gordon, Some Comments and Comparisons: GATT and NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 
25, 26 (1993) (discussing how NAFTA dealt with economic, social, and political relations among the 
three countries). 
85 See Mary E. Burfisher et al., The Impact of NAFTA on the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 
34–39 (2001) (discussing the impact of NAFTA on agriculture, automobile, and textile industry); 
Brendan Greeley et al., Trump Threatens to Undo NAFTA’s Auto Alley, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Jan. 26, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threatens-to-
undo-nafta-s-auto-alley (discussing how under NAFTA, the North American automotive industry has 
become interdependent). 
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Trade Organization (WTO) and provided new powers for compelling other 
countries to enforce IP rights,86 discussed in further detail in Part III. 
2. Shifting National Identity and the Rise of U.S. Economic 
Nationalism 
Public support in the U.S. for free trade began to erode after the passage 
of NAFTA. Research supports that domestic economic factors and 
technological change played a much greater role in job loss than trade 
liberalization.87 Nevertheless, free trade agreements and liberal immigration 
policies were blamed for the loss of low-skill manufacturing jobs, with 
online media falsely proclaiming that NAFTA led to the loss of as many as 
one million jobs.88 Some U.S. states were disproportionately harmed, as 
were previously protected industries, such as sugar and textiles.89 The 
benefits received by others from free trade were not used to mitigate these 
losses.90 
Although NAFTA laid the groundwork for a resurgence of 
protectionism, the economic events of the late 2000s also played a 
substantial role. The 2008 Financial Crisis or “Great Recession” was the 
worst financial downturn since World War II and spread rapidly throughout 
                                                                                                                     
86 See Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2005) (discussing the creation of the 
WTO). 
87 Alan V. Deardorff & Dalia S. Hakura, Trade and Wages—What Are the Questions?, in TRADE 
AND WAGES: LEVELING WAGES DOWN? 104 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Marvin H. Kosters, eds., 1994) 
(observing that empirical studies have not been conclusive regarding protection affecting wages, and 
maintaining that U.S. macroeconomic policy more likely disrupted labor markets); Robert Z. Lawrence 
& Matthew J. Slaughter, International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound 
or Small Hiccup?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS MACROECONOMICS 161, 163, 193 (1993) (noting that empirical 
data does not support theory-based arguments for free trade negatively impacting wages, and maintaining 
that technological change has played a greater role in reducing wages for production workers). 
88 See Lori Wallach, NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/nafta-at-20-
one-million-u_b_4550207.html (stating that NAFTA’s outcome is a “staggering $181 billion U.S. trade 
deficit . . . and the related loss of 1 million net U.S. jobs”); Robert E. Scott, The High Price of ‘Free’ 
Trade 1–3 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper, Nov. 2003), https://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/old/briefingpapers/147/epi_bp147.pdf (concluding that NAFTA “has caused the displacement of 
production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs”). Twenty years of data, however, shows that NAFTA 
helped increase U.S. wages and had little impact on aggregate job loss. Justino De La Cruz & David 
Riker, The Impact of NAFTA on U.S. Labor Markets 10–11 2014) (observing that economic literature 
suggests a 0.17 to 0.2 percent increase in U.S. real wages and discussing how there was no net 
employment changes in the U.S. economy from NAFTA).  
89 See De La Cruz & Riker, supra note 88, at 11 (discussing how the sugar and apparel industries 
were negatively impacted by NAFTA); John McLaren & Shushanik Hakobyan, Looking for Local Labor 
Market Effects of NAFTA 20, 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16535, 2010), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16535.pdf (noting that although NAFTA had little impact on employment, 
it harmed protected industries such as footwear, textiles, and plastics and disproportionately harmed 
certain states). 
90 De La Cruz & Riker, supra note 88, at 11. 
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the world.91 Many major economies fell into recession and others 
experienced an abrupt slowdown.92 Although economists are divided as to 
whether protectionism rose globally in the aftermath,93 when one factors in 
the use of antidumping duties, protectionism did rise in the United States.94 
The financial crisis furthermore led to the failure of the delayed Doha Round 
of the WTO trade negotiations.95 
Meanwhile, a shift was beginning in U.S. national identity. In 2004, 
political scientist and anti-multiculturalist Samuel Huntington noted that a 
“very plausible reaction” to multiculturalism would be an “exclusivist” 
movement, primarily comprised of working-class and middle-class white 
males, seeking to “stop or reverse” changes that they believe had diminished 
their social and economic status, caused their job loss, and displaced their 
culture and identity.96 While this belief was originally not widespread, the 
9/11 attacks allowed it to take root, creating anti-immigrant sentiment and a 
push towards a “white, Christian, native-born” country.97 
This emerging identity can be described as a mix of cultural 
traditionalism and nativism.98 A culturally traditionalist identity is generally 
one that emphasizes a local perspective and religious values.99 Nativist 
                                                                                                                     
91 INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL  2009 (2009), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/Crisis-and-Recovery. 
92 Id. 
93 Compare Hiau Looi Kee et al., Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies 
During the Crisis of 2008, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342, 345 (2013) (concluding that protectionism based 
on tariffs and antidumping duties rose in only a small number of countries), with Matthieu Bussière et 
al., Protectionist Responses to the Crisis: Global Trends and Implications, 34 WORLD ECON. 826, 850 
(2011) (concluding that protectionist measures to restrict trade through tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
rose during the 2008 crisis).  
94 See Kee, supra note 93, at 345 (discussing the rise in U.S. protectionism). 
95 See Bussière et al., supra note 93, at 835 (discussing the stalled Doha Round). Although the Doha 
round did not officially fail until 2015, it was clear much earlier that it was not going to succeed; its 
failure spurred a push for regional trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). See Shawn 
Donnan, Trade Talks Lead to ‘Death of Doha and Birth of New WTO’, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/97e8525e-a740-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83 (stating that “since 2008 the view 
of many outside the WTO’s Geneva headquarters ha[s] been that Doha ought to be buried”). 
96 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 310 (2004); see also Carlos Lozada, Samuel Huntington, a Prophet for the Trump Era, WASH. 
POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/07/18/samuel-
huntington-a-prophet-for-the-trump-era/ (discussing how Samuel Huntington foresaw the rise of 
backlash to multiculturalism). 
97 Regina Branton et al., All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and 
Immigration, 73 J. POL. 664, 667 (2011). 
98 See id. at 667–69, 674 (describing the post-9/11 shift in national identity as an “expression of 
nativist tendencies” characterized by a “distrust or antipathy towards outgroups” and embrace of cultural 
traditionalism); Molly K. McKew, Trump Handed Putin a Stunning Victory, POLITICO MAG. (July 7, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/07/trump-handed-putin-a-stunning-victory-
215353 (maintaining that Trump has embraced traditionalism as the foundation of national identity, 
emphasizing the protection of U.S. “traditional[] values” and culture). 
99 See Gregg Henriques, Trump: An Antiestablishment Hero?, in WHY IRRATIONAL POLITICS 
APPEALS: UNDERSTANDING THE ALLURE OF TRUMP 107, 112 (Mari Fitzduff ed., 2017) (discussing how 
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nationalists, in turn, perceive non-native people as a threat, and they 
maintain that minorities must assimilate into the dominant culture, 
discarding their old customs and learning the language, customs, and values 
of their new nation.100 Immigrants that maintain different value systems are 
viewed as a threat to fragile liberal democracy,101 as are foreign ideologies 
and ideas.102 This identity has emerged at various points in U.S. history, such 
as in anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish sentiment in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
as well as with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan.103  
Prior to the 2016 election, the increase in protectionism appeared to be 
isolated. As one commentator observed in 2012, there was no intellectual 
movement away from free-market capitalism or fundamental rethinking of 
the relationship between the state and the market.104 Notwithstanding the 
resurgence of cultural traditionalism among various groups, support for 
liberal economic policies remained strong in the government.105  
                                                                                                                     
the Republicans have “tried to reach out to cultural traditionalists with emphases on traditional Christian 
family values”); Gregg Henriques, An Anti-Establishment Theory of Trump, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 6, 
2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/theory-knowledge/201609/anti-establishment-theory-
trump (defining cultural traditionalists as “tak[ing] pride in their local perspectives and hometown 
values”). See also, Sean Trende, Why Trump? Why Now?, REALCLEAR POLITICS (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/29/why_trump_why_now_129486.html (contrasting 
cultural traditionalists with cultural cosmopolitanists). 
100 See Uri Friedman, What is a Nativist?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/what-is-nativist-trump/521355/ (explaining 
that political scientist Cas Muddle defines nativism as “an ideology that wants congruence of state and 
nation—the political and the cultural unit”); Jack Citrin, The End of American Identity?, in ONE 
AMERICA?: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND THE DILEMMAS OF DIVERSITY 285, 287 
(Stanley A. Renshon, ed., 2001) (observing that “[t]he nativist response to a multiethnic society is to 
prescribe cultural conformity”); MIRIAM FELDBLUM, RECONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP: THE POLITICS OF 
NATIONALITY REFORM AND IMMIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 53 (1999) (observing that 
nativism is “a specific form of nationalism” that “regards people and ideologies of foreign origin as 
sources of disloyalty and threats to national identity”). 
101 See Jozef Andrew Kosc, The Liberal Roots of Nativism: Where Trump Meets Tocqueville, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-09-
29/liberal-roots-nativism (arguing that Trump and other nativists wrongly believe that “immigrants with 
different value systems pose a threat” to fragile liberal democracies). 
102 See Friedman, supra note 100 (quoting Cas Muddle as stating that “the non-native is not only 
people” but “can also be ideas”); FELDBLUM, supra note 100, at 53 (stating that “[n]ativism, as a specific 
form of nationalism, regards people and ideologies of foreign origin as sources of disloyalty and threats 
to the national identity”). 
103 See Gerald Friedman, Nativism: As American as (Rotten) Apple Pie, DOLLARS & SENSE 13, 14–
17 (Nov./Dec. 2016) (discussing the history of nativism in the United States); Alan M. Kraut, Nativism, 
An American Perennial, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://cmsny.org/publications/kraut-nativism/ (discussing nativism towards immigrants in the United 
States in the 20th and 21st centuries); LOUIS DOW SCISCO, POLITICAL NATIVISM IN NEW YORK STATE 
253 (1901) (discussing nativism in 1800s New York and observing that nativists opposed “foreign ideas 
as to church, state and society”). 
104 See Pryke, supra note 41, at 289–90 (stating that the “shift away from free market capitalism” 
that existed in the 1930s does not exist today).  
105 See id. (discussing that “neoliberalism has been strengthened” over time).  
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Trump’s election, however, provided the link that the anti-free trade 
movement was previously missing. Trump has consistently called for 
protectionist policies106 He has imposed a variety of tariffs on goods from 
traditional allies, such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union.107 He 
has also started a trade war with China with rapidly escalating tariffs.108 
Trump signed a “Buy American and Hire American” executive order, 
claiming the order would “promote economic and national security” and 
“create higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United 
States.”109 He furthermore shunned free trade agreements and rejected the 
TPP, which continued without the United States.110  
To some degree, these protectionist policies have enjoyed bipartisan 
support among voters and politicians.111 Bernie Sanders broadly supported 
protectionist policies during his campaign—he called for “fair trade” instead 
of “free trade” and delivered a strong message against corporate interests.112 
Sanders claimed, notwithstanding strong evidence to the contrary, that the 
                                                                                                                     
106 See Brian Katulis, Democrats Need a Strong Alternative to Trump’s ‘Economic Nationalism,’ 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 17, 2017, 1:13 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/17/democrats-need-a-
strong-alternative-to-trumps-economic-nationalism/ (observing Trump’s relative consistency with 
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protectionism/  (arguing that Trump’s executive order and other actions run the risk of normalizing 
protectionism). 
110 See Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-
nafta.html (discussing Trump’s abandonment of the TPP); Alex Ward, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Has Been Resurrected—and It’s Happening Without the US, VOX (Nov. 11, 2017, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/11/16637826/trump-trans-pacific-partnership (discussing TPP 
negotiations with the remaining countries).  
111 In the fall of 2016, 85% of Republicans and 54% of Democrats believed that free trade had cost 
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globalized economy was increasing global poverty.113 His website states that 
“[i]f corporate America wants us to buy their products they need to 
manufacture those products in this country, not in China or other low-wage 
countries.”114  
But unlike Sanders’s anti-corporate position, Trump’s policies appear to 
be grounded in the reemerging national identity of cultural traditionalism.115 
As George W. Bush noted, under Trump, “[w]e’ve seen nationalism 
distorted into nativism” and have “forgotten the dynamism that immigration 
has always brought to America.”116 Trump has tapped into people’s worst 
fears—that free trade has destroyed U.S. jobs, that immigrants are killing us, 
and that the country’s best days are behind it.117 Commentator Eric Li has 
observed that Trump is pushing back against a world that is moving towards 
“a unified set of rules and standards in economics, politics, international 
relations, and even morality.”118 The fear is that cultural distinctions between 
countries will disappear and give rise to shared values that are at odds with  
those who hold power.119  
Strong sovereignty is a key part of Trump’s vision for U.S. national 
identity and nationalism. In addressing the United Nations, Trump 
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(discussing how Trump “channels the fear coursing through the electorate” and uses it to gain supporters). 
In Identity Crisis, Sides et al. maintain the election “became a vehicle for a different kind of identity 
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America.” Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Donald Trump’s Identity Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), 
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repeatedly referenced “strong, sovereign nations,” including the claim that 
they “allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by 
God.”120 He exalted countries “that are rooted in their histories” and “home 
to patriots.”121 Trump further claimed that “the nation-state remains the best 
vehicle for elevating the human condition” and maintained that all countries 
should put their own interests first.122 As one commentator noted, this speech 
conveyed Trump’s view that people are ultimately “defined by their 
membership in a national community.”123 
As discussed earlier, presidents shape national identity by choosing 
which groups to include or exclude in society. Trump has taken an especially 
active role in articulating who he believes does and does not belong in the 
United States. He has described Africa, Haiti, and El Salvador as 
“shithole[s],”124 Mexicans as criminals and “rapists,”125 and attempted to 
institute a Muslim ban.126 Meanwhile, Trump has advocated for more 
immigration from Norway,127 thereby sending a strong message that 
minority and non-Christians are to be disdained and excluded, while white 
Christian immigrants will be welcome. By failing to condemn white 
supremacy marches, he has also sent the signal that hate groups are now 
tolerated or even welcomed in society.128  
Under the Trump administration, economic nationalism has been fueled 
by the idea that outsiders and foreign ideas are harming Americans, and 
globalism is eroding traditional Christian values. Prior to his election, Trump 
discussed visiting “crumbling cities and the struggling schools,” and 
promised that “the American worker will have his or her job protected from 
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unfair foreign competition.”129 He has characterized foreign countries as 
“cheaters,” claiming that they “subsidize their goods, devalue their 
currencies, violate their agreements and cheat in every way imaginable.”130 
Trump proclaimed that “[w]e are not going to let the United States be taken 
advantage of anymore.”131 As Part II discusses, this nationalist perspective 
has major implications for U.S. patent policy. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATION NATIONALISM 
Although scholars have highlighted the importance of innovation since 
World War II, the patent system has not always been structured to promote 
it. Patents were rewards for inventors that promoted the prompt disclosure 
of new inventions to the public. But over time, the purpose of the U.S. patent 
system shifted, with patent rights being used to promote a government-
cultivated identity of technological innovativeness.  
A. The Rise of Innovation in the U.S. Patent System 
At first glance, the promotion of innovation appears to be integrated into 
the U.S. intellectual property system. The Constitution grants Congress 
authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”132 Given 
this language, one could easily believe that the historical driving force 
behind patent law was promoting innovation.  
Yet, the modern patent system was not designed with innovation in 
mind. When Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act, it did not consider 
tailoring patent law to promote the creation or dissemination of new, 
beneficial technologies.133 Pasquale Federico observed that the objectives of 
the statute were merely to revise and amend patent law, as well as to codify 
common law practice so that patent law would be “easier to follow and 
understand.”134  
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Courts originally paid little attention to the promotion of innovation. 
Rather, IP was regarded as a reward for new inventions, and innovation was 
merely a weak justification.135 For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 
the Supreme Court stated that Congress may not “enlarge the patent 
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit 
gained thereby,” and it maintained that “[i]nnovation, advancement, and 
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a 
patent system.”136 The goal of the patent system was to reward inventors 
who disclosed new and useful inventions to the public.137  
Beginning in the 1970s, innovation became a focal point for the patent 
system. Around this time, presidents began to link innovation and patents.138 
President Nixon emphasized the importance of technological innovation on 
the economy and discussed how patents can help facilitate this.139 In 1978, 
President Carter announced an Advisory Committee to study industrial 
innovation, noting that “[i]nnovation provides a basis for the Nation’s 
economic growth” and “is closely related to productivity and to 
competitiveness of U.S. products.”140 The following year, he proposed 
upgrading and modernizing the patent system and expanding the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) authority to reexamine patents.141 Carter 
sought to increase research and development funding and to foster 
innovation from small firms.142  
For the judicial branch, a similar shift began in the mid-1980s. As law 
professor Gaia Bernstein observed, lower courts began discussing the role 
of innovation in the United States, including how it promotes public 
welfare.143 The Supreme Court later highlighted the importance of tailoring 
patent law to stimulate innovation without unduly impeding new invention. 
For example, in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the Court 
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observed that patent law must balance promoting innovation through patent 
protection with facilitating the imitation “necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.” 144 
With regard to legislation, a shift began in the 1980s. The Bayh-Dole 
Act was the result of Carter’s call for increasing productivity through 
industrial innovation145 and was designed to provide incentives for 
commercialization of government-funded inventions.146 In the Patent Law 
Amendments Act of 1984, Congress created a National Commission of 
Innovation and Productivity147 with the goal of fostering technological 
change and stimulating innovation among privately employed individuals.148 
By the time the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was passed, 
promoting innovation had become an explicit and key goal of Congress.149 
The House Judiciary Committee acknowledged the importance of “our 
national culture of innovation,” and it expressed the need to “nurture U.S. 
innovation” by helping small business entities.150 The AIA’s passage was 
designed, in part, to revise poor PTO procedure, which some believed  
threatened the country’s “competitive edge in the global economy.”151 
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B. Innovativeness as a Component of U.S. National Identity 
These changes in how the government views innovation shows the 
gradual formation of a new component of U.S. national identity—
technological innovativeness. Politicians do not seek innovation merely for 
the sake of promoting economic growth; they want to be the best innovators. 
President Obama argued that “[t]he first step in winning the future is 
encouraging American innovation” and said that we needed to “out-
innovate” other countries.152 The late Senator John McCain agreed, and 
emphasized that the United States had “the ability to out-compete anyone in 
the world and out-innovate.”153 The media further helped promote the belief 
that it is important to be the most innovative country in the world.154 The 
United States’ innovative identity is recognized abroad and has been studied 
with the goal of emulating it in the European Union.155 
Several scholars have linked technological innovation with nationalism. 
Historian David Edgerton described “techno-nationalism,” in which various 
countries have promoted “the inventive citizen” as a part of modern 
nationalism by exaggerating the importance of their nationals’ inventions.156 
He further observed the adaptation of national identities in various countries 
to accommodate technological advancement, by using nationalistic beliefs 
to spur research and development funding.157 Communications scholar 
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Marco Andria has argued that technology plays an important role in shaping 
how citizens develop regional and national allegiance, particularly 
technology relating to communication.158  
U.S. innovation identity further ties into economic nationalism. 
Although promoting technological innovation is not protectionist, 
government officials promote it to advance economic growth, regarding it 
as “the key driver to our economy.”159 Dr. Patrick Gallagher—the former 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology—described 
promoting technological innovation as the “centerpiece” of Obama’s 
economic agenda.160 As Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Ben 
Bernanke maintained that “innovation and technological change are 
undoubtedly central to the growth process” and discussed the importance of 
the government funding research and development to promote innovation.161  
The government’s commitment to promoting innovation sometimes 
borders on propaganda. For example, law professor Mark Lemley reported 
receiving an e-mail from an unnamed State Department official regarding a 
social media project between the State Department’s Bureau of Economic 
Affairs and the Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement.162 Set for the 
week after Independence Day “when everyone gets back from vacation but 
will still feel patriotic and summery,” the official encouraged Lemley and 
others to tie Independence Day to innovation, with statements such as “Bet 
you couldn’t see the Independence Day fireworks without bifocals; first 
American diplomat Ben Franklin invented them #bestIPmoment 
@StateDept.”163 The e-mail claimed that pro-IP groups including the Motion 
Picture Association of America and the Recording Industry of America 
agreed to participate.164 
Like with other forms of nationalism, there has been an undercurrent of 
victimization with innovation and patent rights. This can be seen most 
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clearly with trade-related provisions pertaining to IP rights. As discussed 
above, under the Trade Act of 1974,  the ITC was granted final authority to  
exclude imported products resulting from unfair trade.165 Although the 
statute was not intended to address IP infringement, patent attorneys 
discovered that it could be used to exclude infringing goods.166 Interest 
groups lobbied Congress, maintaining that action was needed to combat 
international IP piracy.167 Using this victimization narrative, patent attorneys 
successfully lobbied to have patent-specific language added to § 337 of the 
Tariff Act, making it easier for patent holders to block infringing goods from 
entering the United States.168 This put foreign litigants, as well as U.S. 
companies using imported components, at a disadvantage.169  
The Trade Act of 1974 also introduced § 301, which authorizes the 
President to retaliate if “an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country” 
either “violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies 
benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement” or if it “is 
unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce.”170 Such 
investigations may be initiated by a private party or by the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR).171 As discussed in Part III.C, this provision has been 
embraced by the Trump administration to protect IP rights.172  
III. ADVANCING ECONOMIC NATIONALISM THROUGH PATENTS 
The United States advances economic nationalism through its patent 
policies. Under the TRIPS agreement, countries may not give preferential 
treatment to their own nationals in their respective countries’ laws.173 But 
even neutrally applied domestic patent laws can advance an economically 
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$20 billion a year); id. at 213–14 (statement of the Office of the Chemical Industry Trade Advisor) 
(discussing the problem of foreign piracy to U.S. intellectual property holders).  
168 Kumar, supra note 76, at 549. 
169 See id. (explaining that the 1988 Trade Act makes litigation easier and cheaper against 
companies who receive imported goods). 
170 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2016). See also Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining 
Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122, 
1122–24 (1987) (providing a detailed overview of § 301). 
171 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2012). 
172 See infra Part III.C. 
173 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65 (2008) 
(observing that a “core principle of TRIPS” is the requirement for WTO members to adopt the GATT 
principles of national treatment and “most-favored nation” treatment, thereby limiting members from 
discriminating against foreign inventors or favoring their nationals in IP protection). 
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nationalistic agenda by increasing protection in ways that benefit the United 
States’s own industries.174 Similarly, trade agreements can be used to get 
stronger protection for patents in developing countries, which 
disproportionately benefits the United States.  
A. Domestic Substantive Patent Rights 
Innovation plays a major role in the economy, but it is less certain what 
role patents play.175 Legal commentators generally agree that indefinitely 
expanding patent and other IP rights does not promote innovation, let alone 
domestic economic growth,176 and some scholars have proposed using 
alternative means for financing innovation.177 As law professor Robert 
Merges and economist Richard Nelson observed almost thirty years ago, a 
“potential inventor is also a potential infringer” whose ability to innovate 
could be harmed by another patent.178 It is also clear that some industries, 
like biopharmaceuticals, benefit from broad patent rights more than 
others.179  
                                                                                                                     
174 See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing 
Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118–19 (2009) (discussing how the TRIPS 
Agreement favored countries with “developed national systems of innovation and whose multinational 
companies owned plenty of patented high-tech products to sell or manufacture around the world” 
(footnote omitted)). But see William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1909, 1926–27 (2013) (arguing that even if U.S. patent law sometimes favors U.S. firms, the 
advantage has lessened as the “innovative capacities” of foreign firms has expanded and transaction costs 
to acquiring patents has decreased). 
175  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8–9 (2011) (discussing how competition promotes innovation and 
observing that patent assertion entities “can deter innovation by raising costs and risks without making a 
technological contribution”); Gerard J. Tellis et. al., Radical Innovation Across Nations: The 
Preeminence of Corporate Culture, 73 J. MARKETING 3, 15–16 (2009) (finding that for radical or 
disruptive innovation in firms, internal corporate culture is the primary driver, and not patents). 
176 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,  1031 (1989) (observing that although technological change 
promotes economic growth, “it does not necessarily follow that patent protection is necessary to preserve 
adequate economic incentives for invention and innovation”); Henry C. Su, Invention is Not Innovation 
and Intellectual Property is Not Just Like Any Other Form of Property: Competition Themes from the 
FTC’s March 2011 Patent Report, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1–2 (Aug. 2011) (maintaining that promoting 
invention under the patent system does not necessarily promote innovation). 
177 See Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1303–
4 (2016) (discussing the growing concern among academics that IP rights hinder innovation and 
observing that several academics have called for the use of direct public financing); Daniel J. Hemel & 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 314 (2013) 
(maintaining that prizes, grants, and refundable tax credits can incentivize innovation like patents, and if 
structured appropriately, can reduce “deadweight loss”). 
178 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 916 (1990). 
179 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2001) (discussing problems that broad patent protection can cause to the software 
industry); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589–90 
(2003) (discussing the wide variation across industries regarding usefulness of patent rights). 
 
 232 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:2 
Various legislators, however, are in favor of broader patent protection 
to facilitate global competitiveness and promote innovation.180 In 2018, the 
bipartisan STRONGER Patents Act was reintroduced in the House, which 
would make it considerably harder for third parties to challenge bad patents 
and make it easier for patent holders to obtain injunctions.181 The bill 
explicitly links strong patents to innovation, asserting that “the United States 
needs to uphold strong patent protections to maintain its position as the 
world’s premier innovative country.”182 The proposed Restoring American 
Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018 seeks to go one step further. In order 
“[t]o promote the leadership of the United States in global innovation,” the 
bill would abolish the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, making it harder to 
invalidate bad patents.183  
At first glance, it might appear that such domestic patent policy and 
economic nationalism are unrelated. The Patent Act applies equally to 
domestic and foreign inventors, as is required by the TRIPS Agreement. 
Provisions that were blatantly discriminatory to foreign inventors were 
removed under the America Invents Act.184  
Unduly strong patent and other IP rights, however, can create a market 
distortion similar to that of protectionist tariffs. The IP system is an attempt 
to correct market failures that occur when people can freely copy, thereby 
                                                                                                                     
180 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5411 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) 
(maintaining that strengthening the U.S. patent system “will help us maintain our competitive edge both 
domestically and abroad”); 157 CONG. REC. S5422 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Harold 
Rogers) (maintaining that allowing the PTO to keep its fees “will help U.S. innovators remain 
competitive in today’s global economy”); 157 CONG. REC. S1089 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“If America is to win the global economic competition, we need the improvements 
in our patent system that [the Patent Reform Act of 2011] can bring.”). 
Note that this belief is not necessarily true—strong U.S. patents also benefit foreign firms that apply 
for them, and weak patents can spur innovation through facilitating domestic competition. See Lucas S. 
Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1236–38 (2015) 
(maintaining that global competitiveness concerns favor weakening U.S. patents). 
181 See Steve Brachmann, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, Seeks to Strengthen a 
Crippled Patent System, IP Watchdog, March 26, 2018, 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-act-house/id=95188/ (discussing bipartisan 
legislation curtail the AIA). See also STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018). 
182 STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, S. 1390, 115th Cong. § 101(8) (2018).  
183 Restoring American Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. (2018). See 
also, Stephen Key, Pro-Patent Bills are in Congress. Why That Matters, FORBES, July 24, 2018, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/07/24/pro-patent-bills-are-in-congress-why-that-
matters/#6003644691d3 (discussing how H.R. 6264 would abolish the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). 
184 Prior to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, the first-to-invent system 
explicitly discriminated against foreign inventors, by restricting proof of invention to activity that 
occurred in the United States. See R. Carl Moy, Essay: Patent Harmonization, Protectionism, and 
Legislation, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 777, 783–88 (1992) (discussing how pre-AIA 35 
U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (g) discriminated against foreign inventors by limiting foreign information that 
could defeat an inventor’s patent application and created a transfer of wealth from foreign to domestic 
entities). 
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decreasing the incentive to innovate.185 IP rights prevent competition and 
allow the owner to charge supra-competitive prices, with the goal of 
benefiting the public through encouraging the creation and dissemination of 
new works.186  
Like other regulatory regimes, the IP system does not always operate for 
the public welfare.187 Public choice theory suggests that Congress will pass 
legislation that benefits the best-organized interest groups.188 These groups 
may share ideological interests,189 which can include promoting national 
identity. Nationalistic lawmakers can be misled by those that purport to 
support a nationalistic agenda, but ultimately seek to benefit themselves at 
the public’s expense.190 
Strong IP rights can serve a quasi-protectionist purpose. Congress can 
strengthen neutral IP laws in ways that benefit well-funded and well-
organized industries in which the United States dominates.191 In doing so, 
government helps these groups compete globally by providing them with 
additional revenue from enhanced protection.192 Such behavior is actually 
anticipated under the national treatment provision of the GATT, which 
authorizes the WTO to deal with disputes in which facially neutral legal 
                                                                                                                     
185 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
335, 336 (2004) (maintaining that the “IP system is a very elaborate effort to correct [the] market failure” 
of free riding). 
186 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV.  989, 996–97 (1997) (describing how IP rights hinder competition, thereby allowing IP owners to 
charge higher prices). 
187 See Hovenkamp, supra note 185, at 337 (observing that the IP system “is hardly immune from 
the legislative imperfections that public choice theory uncovers”); Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade 
Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285, 293–94 (2003) 
(discussing how IP rights distort competition in international markets). 
188 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory 
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 287 (1988) (observing that “[g]roups that are formally 
organized and willing to spend money to obtain or block legislation will tend to monopolize the attention 
of legislators, at the expense of groups that are not organized.”). 
189 Id. at 286. 
190 See Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice View of International Political Economy, 38 INT’L ORG. 
199, 210 (1984) (discussing how interest groups influence tariffs); Erich Weede, Economic Policy and 
International Security: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade and Democratic Peace, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 519, 
52728 (1995) (discussing how rent-seeking by interest groups undermines free trade).  
191 Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye View 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1422 (1994) (discussing two facially neutral 
ways that Congress can disadvantage foreign producers in favor of American producers); see infra Part 
III.A.1. 
192 Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 
83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2188 (1995) (discussing how parties can challenge facially neutral regulations or 
taxes for violations of the GATT’s national treatment provision); Farber & Hudec, supra note 191, at 
1421 (discussing how neutral regulations can disproportionately impact foreign firms). 
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measures disproportionately impact foreign firms.193 The losers are U.S. 
consumers, who must pay higher prices for goods and services.194  
This quasi-protectionism can be seen under the Copyright Term 
Extension Act (CTEA), in which rent-seeking content owners successfully 
lobbied Congress to extend the copyright of existing works.195 The CTEA 
was facially neutral; it helped bring the U.S. copyright term in line with some 
of its foreign counterparts and did not single out domestic applicants for 
special treatment.196 But there was no discernable public benefit, leading 
some to argue that the CTEA was a private appropriation of public 
property.197 
Although simple protectionism can be used to describe the drive toward 
stronger copyright protection, nationalistic rhetoric plays a role as well. In 
an open letter to Trump, signed by nineteen industry groups including 
Recording Industry Association of America and American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers, the music industry lobbied for 
                                                                                                                     
193 See Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory 
Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 202–03 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of World 
Trade Organization panels assessing facially neutral regulations that have protectionist effects).   
194 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 
103, 118, 125 (2008) (discussing how the U.S. patent system puts the interests of patentees ahead of “the 
much larger and more diverse population that represents users of patented products or processes” and 
maintaining that the Copyright Act “reads like a recipe book for capture”). 
195 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2)); Christopher 
Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical 
Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 78 (2013) (discussing the lobbying 
efforts of Disney and other copyright holders and observing that eighteen of the twenty-five  sponsors 
for the CTEA received Disney money); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the 
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (2000) (maintaining that the “CTEA has precisely the same effects as the 
Elizabethan grant of a monopoly in ale or printing” given that “[i]t guarantees an income stream” to 
favorites of the legislature); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright 
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2338, 2343 
(2003) (discussing how the CTEA was rent-seeking that the Framers of the Constitution had intended to 
prevent and observing that Disney worked to contract the public domain while exploiting fairy tales that 
were in the public domain). 
196 See Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105452, at 4 (1998) (describing the purpose 
of the law and indicating that “[e]xtending copyright term to life of the author plus seventy years means 
that the U.S. works will generally be protected for the same amount of time as works created by European 
Union authors”). 
197 See Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 195, at 37 (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that 
the principle arguments for copyright term extension are unsupported); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and 
Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 421 (2002) (discussing the lack of compelling policy 
arguments supporting term extension and the strong lobbying by the copyright industry); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 194, at 12627 (discussing how the public bore the cost of benefiting a few major content 
providers under the CTEA). See also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1023 
(1990) (maintaining that a robust public domain is necessary for maintaining the integrity of the copyright 
system). 
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increased copyright protection in trade agreements.198 The letter described 
music “as one of America’s national treasures” and urged Trump to protect 
rights for “those who . . . form the cultural identity of our great nation.”199 
Such nationalistic sentiment is not unique to the music industry; for 
example, George Lucas and Steven Spielberg both made similar appeals in 
the 1980s as part of an unsuccessful push for moral rights for filmmakers.200  
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry provides the clearest example of 
domestic protectionist patent policy. The industry uses the cost of research 
and development to justify extending drug protection through additional 
patents or regulatory exclusivities.201 It also uses this argument to 
successfully resist price controls found in other countries.202 Consequently, 
U.S. consumers pay much higher prices than the rest of the world and 
thereby subsidize pharmaceutical companies.203 Other countries benefit 
from the drugs that get developed without paying the high costs.204  
The government further provides an indirect subsidy to small 
pharmaceutical start-ups under the Bayh-Dole Act—which allows 
universities, non-profits, and small businesses to patent and commercialize 
inventions that were developed with federal research money.205 Firms must 
agree that any resulting products “will be manufactured substantially in the 
United States.”206 U.S. consumers essentially pay twice for new 
                                                                                                                     
198 Daniel Kreps, Music Industry Urges Trump to Strengthen Intellectual Property Laws, ROLLING 
STONE (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:52 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/music-industry-
urges-trump-to-strengthen-intellectual-property-laws-118036/. 
199 Id. 
200 George Lucas testified before Congress that the United States was “in need of a moral anchor to 
help define and protect its intellectual and cultural heritage” and Spielberg described film as “perhaps 
our nation’s foremost ambassadors to the world . . . .” PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT 
WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE INTERNET 147 (2012). 
201 Robin C. Feldman & Connie Wang, May Your Drug Price Be Ever Green, Oct. 29, 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3061567 (discussing how pharmaceutical 
companies successfully added new patents or other exclusivities to existing drugs). 
202 See Ben Hirschler, How the U.S. Pays 3 Times More for Drugs, SCI. AM., 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-u-s-pays-3-times-more-for-drugs (last visited Sept. 
9, 2018) (discussing how countries that directly or indirectly regulate drug costs have lower drug prices 
compared to the United States). 
203 See Elizabeth Whitman, How The US Subsidizes Cheap Drugs For Europe, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap-drugs-europe-2112662 
(discussing how U.S. consumers fund global research and development for new drugs). 
204 See Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More Than Other Countries for Drugs; Norway and 
Other State-Run Health Systems Drive Hard Bargains, and are Willing to Say No to Costly Therapy, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s-pays-more-than-other-countries-
for-drugs-1448939481 (discussing how U.S. consumers subsidize global pharmaceutical research by 
paying higher prices for drugs). 
205 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12) 
(allowing universities, non-profits, and small business to patent and commercialize inventions that arise 
from government-funded research).   
206 35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond 
Borders, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 282, 287 (2017), 
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inventions—through taxpayer funding for federal grants and through 
purchasing the later-patented product or service.207 This may constitute an 
impermissible subsidy under the TRIPS Agreement.208  
Such quasi-protectionism links back to economic nationalism. In 
following this system, the United States benefits by maintaining its identity 
as being the global pharmaceutical innovation leader with the greatest 
number of biopharmaceutical patents, peer-reviewed publications, clinical 
trials, and venture capital investments.209 It enjoys economic benefits from 
the pharmaceutical industry, while furthering its identity as an innovative 
country.210 
B. U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
Another way in which the United States advances economic nationalism 
is through policing imported goods. Section 337 of the Tariff Act declares 
unlawful the importation of “articles that infringe a valid and enforceable 
United States patent.”211 The ITC possesses a broad power under § 337 of 
the Tariff Act—the ability to grant “exclusion orders”—which direct 
Customs to seize infringing imported goods.212 But only U.S patent holders 
with a domestic industry can take advantage of this powerful remedy.213  
In theory, the ITC can consider public welfare in its orders.214 Section 
337 allows the ITC to not exclude an article if there would be an “effect of 
                                                                                                                     
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919093 (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act’s “explicit 
preference for federally funded inventions to be manufactured in the United States”). 
207 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, 
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000) (discussing how the public pays 
twice under Bayh-Dole). 
208 See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: 
Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 211 n.81 (2014) 
(maintaining that the Bayh-Dole Act is arguably “an impermissible subsidy under the GATT rules”). 
209 See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURER’S ASSOCIATION ET AL., THE U.S. 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE GROWTH AND THE FACTORS THAT WILL 
DRIVE IT 13–14 (2014), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-economic-futures-
report.pdf; Yuanjia Hu et al., Is the United States Still Dominant in the Global Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Network?, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2013), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0077247 (arguing empirically that the 
United States can be considered “the dominant locus of drug innovation” from 2006 to 2010). 
210 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 167, 210 (2016) (discussing how countries may invest in knowledge production to receive 
prestige-based awards). 
211 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
212 Id. § 1337(d). 
213 See id. § 1337(a)(2) (stating that § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) is applicable to a patent holder only if a 
domestic industry relating to the patented article “exists or is in the process of being established”). 
214 See In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *284 
(June 19, 2007) (Pearson, Chairman, & Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (noting that Congress recognized 
how broad exclusion orders could disrupt the economy and provided the ITC with the discretion to not 
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such exclusion upon the public health and welfare.”215 However, the plain 
interpretation of this language in § 337 is nearly toothless. The ITC 
Commissioners have only denied an exclusion order on public welfare 
grounds three times in its history, all in extraordinary cases.216 By contrast, 
under the Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. decision, a 
plaintiff seeking an injunction under the Patent Act must meet the more 
stringent equitable balancing test.217 
The rationale for the ITC’s broad use of exclusion orders, 
notwithstanding public harm, is a belief that a strong right to exclude helps 
“spur innovation.”218 In the legislative history of the 1987 amendment to the 
Tariff Act, Congress stated that the purpose of enforcing IP rights was to 
benefit the public by promoting disclosure of IP to the public.219 
Consequently, Congress asserted that importation of infringing articles 
“indirectly harms the public interest.”220 This language, combined with 
Congress abolishing a previous requirement that the plaintiff show injury, 
led the ITC to conclude that exclusion orders should be granted to “protect 
the intellectual property itself.”221  
An argument can be made that the ITC grants exclusion orders merely 
for the sake of keeping patents valuable, in order to reinforce the United 
States’ identity of innovativeness. The public subsidizes patent holders with 
a domestic industry by paying higher prices for goods that could be imported 
more cheaply. Moreover, foreign patent holders are discriminated against 
because they cannot take advantage of the ITC without first developing a 
U.S.-based industry. 
C. Foreign Patent Systems & International Trade 
Patent policy advances economic nationalism when the United States is 
successful in getting other countries to adopt strong patent protection. 
During Maureen Ohlhausen’s tenure as the Federal Trade Commission 
                                                                                                                     
impose a broad exclusion order if it would not serve the public interest), rev’d in part sub nom. Kyocera 
Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
215 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012). 
216 See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (observing that 
the Commissioners of the ITC have “found public interest considerations to outweigh the need for 
injunctive relief in protecting intellectual property rights” on only three occasions). Note that all three of 
these cases were prior to the 1988 amendment that removed the requirement that a patentee show 
irreparable harm. Id. 
217 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that the four-part 
equitable balancing test applies for injunctions issued under the Patent Act). 
218 In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103. 
219 S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 128 (1987). 
220 Id. at 128–29. 
221 In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *106; see also In re Certain 
Mobile Devices, No. 337-TA-744, 2012 ITC LEXIS 2177, at *57 (June 5, 2012) (maintaining “the public 
interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights”). 
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acting chairman, she observed that what the United States does in patent law 
“reverberates around the world.”222 But this effect does not arise from the 
United States leading by example; it comes from the United States forcing 
other countries to adopt U.S.-style patent rights under threat of sanctions and 
tariffs.  
1. 1980 to 1995 
In the mid-1980s, President Reagan began aggressively using the Trade 
Act to punish countries that failed to respect U.S. IP rights and released a 
“Trade Policy Action Plan” that included IP protection.223 South Korea 
lacked patent rights for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, 
and it lacked strong copyright and trademark protection.224 This led to the 
USTR initiating a § 301 action against South Korea for inadequately 
protecting IP, which resulted in a 1986 agreement in which South Korea 
agreed to amend its patent and other IP laws.225 Reagan further imposed 
$200 million in trade sanctions against Brazil for failing to respect 
pharmaceutical patents.226 This came less than a year after the United States 
increased tariffs on Brazilian exports and prohibited the importation of its 
computer products.227 In 1988, Congress amended the Trade Act to require 
the U.S. Trade Representative to identify countries that are inadequately 
protecting IP rights.228  
The United States’ use of § 301 was met with broad criticism in the 
foreign community. In 1989, during a meeting regarding developments in 
the trading system under the GATT, the representative of Japan accused the 
United States of flouting the GATT rules and acting as “judge, jury, and 
executioner.”229 The European Community representative described § 301 
as a “commercial nuclear bomb” and stated that the Community would not 
“stand by helplessly” while the United States moved “inexorably towards 
                                                                                                                     
222 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 106 (2016) (arguing that developing countries considering how to protect 
technology look to the United States for guidance).  
223 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE POLICY ACTION PLAN 2 (Sept. 23, 1985); see 
also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, 
and Developments, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 633, 634, 653–662 (1986) (discussing the increase in § 301 
proceedings beginning in 1985). 
224 See Memorandum on the South Korean-United States Copyright, Patent, and Trademark Rights 
Agreement, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1104 (Aug. 14, 1986) (discussing South Korea’s IP system). 
225 Id. at 1104-05.  
226 Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations on United States Trade Sanctions 
Against Brazil, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 947 (July 22, 1988). 
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committing an irreparable act of folly and unleash the apocalypse.”230 
Various other representatives observed the tension between the United 
States’ commitment to bilateral dispute resolution agreements and its 
unilateral approach under § 301.231  
Concerns regarding the lack of IP enforcement by some countries led to 
changes in trade agreements and institutions. Although the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was supposed “to promote the 
protection of intellectual property throughout the world,”232 the United 
States was concerned by attempts from developing countries to weaken 
patent rules under the Paris Convention.233 The United States and others 
maintained that WIPO lacked the necessary authority to sanction non-
compliant countries and pushed for IP protection through multilateral 
agreements.234 This led to the creation of the WTO in 1995 and paved the 
way for the inclusion of IP in future trade agreements.235  
2. 1995 to 2016 
The shift to the WTO and linkage of IP protection to trade benefitted the 
United States. Developing nations that agreed to adopt strong IP protection 
secured access to market various goods.236 Countries that fought against it 
were subject to coercive negotiating techniques, including threats of trade 
retaliation against countries that objected to U.S. policy on IP rights under 
the TRIPS Agreement.237  
The United States developed a reputation for being far more aggressive 
than other developed countries, both for the content of U.S. agreements, as 
well as the negotiation process and implementation phase.238 For example, 
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during the height of the AIDS epidemic, South Africa passed a statute 
permitting the compulsory licensing of drug patents and parallel 
importing.239 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South 
Africa led forty-one pharmaceutical companies in challenging the law, 
claiming that South Africa was violating the TRIPS Agreement.240 The 
plaintiffs included U.S.-based companies Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, and 
Eli Lilly.241  
The Clinton administration launched what the State Department 
described as an “assiduous, concerted campaign” to overturn the law.242 This 
included placing South Africa on a Special 301 Watch List of countries that 
might be violating U.S. IP rights, withholding preferential tariff treatment to 
South African imports, and aggressively lobbying its government.243 Critics 
responded that South Africa’s law was permitted under Article 31(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which allowed for the compulsory licensing of drugs 
during national emergencies.244 The companies in the lawsuit eventually 
dropped suit and agreed to pay South Africa’s legal fees.245  
The Obama administration also used the Special 301 list to call out 
countries that it viewed as not adequately protecting pharmaceuticals.246 
U.S. companies sought to use the USTR office to pressure India to provide 
stronger pharmaceutical patent protection.247 Obama ultimately initiated a 
special review of India’s IP laws with the implicit threat of sanctions for its 
weak system of patent rights.248 AIDS activist groups maintained that the 
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U.S. government was using the list to coerce countries into giving up rights 
provided by the TRIPS Agreement.249 
The Obama administration pushed for the United States to join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was criticized on several fronts, 
including that it provided various boons to the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry.250 The TPP required signatories to expand the period of data 
exclusivity for biologic drugs.251 Although the United States’ initial demand 
for a twelve-year period was later reduced, some expressed skepticism that 
increased protection would promote innovation.252 The TPP was further 
criticized for utilizing “patent evergreening,” requiring governments to grant 
pharmaceutical companies additional patents for changes to existing 
medications, even if the changes were no more beneficial than the original 
drug.253 
The force that the United States exerts to strengthen foreign patent 
protection is illustrated by the final version of the TPP. After Trump 
withdrew the United States, eleven countries entered into the TPP11.254 
Although much of the agreement remained unchanged, eighteen pages were 
suspended or removed from the IP section.255 The TPP11 lacks patent term 
extensions if parties experience delays in obtaining a patent.256 Also missing 
are special concessions related to pharmaceutical patents, including all of 
the biologics and patent test data provisions.257 The TPP11 no longer 
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contains new methods for protecting technology and information, and it 
allows countries to retain shorter copyright terms of life plus fifty years.258 
It is important to note that the “upward” harmonization of IP rights has 
been rightfully criticized by several scholars, who argue that developing 
countries are harmed by increased rents and loss of access to knowledge.259 
This is especially true for low-to-middle-income developing countries and 
their firms. Such countries do not necessarily benefit from increased patent 
protection, given that they lack the resources for developing new 
technologies and obtaining patents.260 The combination of strong IP rights 
and forced foreign access through the TRIPS Agreement’s national 
treatment provision has led to a transfer of ownership from developing 
countries to the developed world.261  
Multi-lateral trade agreements likely have a mixed effect on innovation. 
Although developing countries benefit from trade agreements by gaining 
access to U.S. markets, these benefits come at the cost of being saddled with 
patent protection that provides little immediate benefit and at least short-
term harm. Indeed, when countries like the United States were developing, 
their inventors did not have to negotiate a minefield of foreign patent claims 
and were able to build up their technological capacity through innovation.262 
But from a nationalistic perspective, trade agreements bring major benefits 
for large, well-connected U.S. industries and allow the United States to 
promote itself as an innovative country.  
D. Changes Under the Trump Administration 
The Trump administration represents a significant change in how the 
United States approaches patent policy. Prior presidents promoted 
innovation identity by strengthening domestic patent rights and extracting 
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strong patent protection from foreign countries through trade agreements.263 
Innovation identity, however has come into conflict with Trump’s nativist 
and culturally traditionalist strain of nationalism.  
With regard to the push towards strong patent rights, there has been no 
substantial change under the Trump administration. Any decision to expand 
the scope of patents would be driven by Congress, and such an effort would 
fit with Trump’s views of strong sovereignty. Expanding the ITC’s powers 
under the Tariff Act would likewise support Trump’s “America First” 
nationalistic philosophy.  
The largest change has occurred in foreign trade policy. As discussed 
above, prior presidents recognized that trade agreements can be used to get 
other countries to expand patent protection.264 Although the concessions that 
the United States provided in exchange for increased patent protection 
harmed workers in some domestic industries, patent rights holders benefitted 
immensely, as did the country as a whole.265  
Trump, by contrast, has expressed great disdain for trade agreements, 
maintaining that they enrich foreign elites and victimize U.S. workers.266 He 
described NAFTA as “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere, but 
certainly ever signed in this country” and a “total disaster.”267 During his 
campaign, Trump criticized the TPP as a “potential disaster” for the United 
States, claiming that it hurt U.S. manufacturing.268 Upon abandoning it as 
president, Trump proclaimed this to be a “[g]reat thing for the American 
worker.”269 Such a position is fully consistent with the new national identity 
of foreigners as posing a threat to traditional values.  
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In taking this position, Trump has turned away from innovation 
nationalism. By walking away from the TPP, Trump threw away major IP 
benefits for various industries including longer patent terms for drugs, 
additional protections for biologic medicines, and longer copyright 
protection. Furthermore, Trump diminished U.S. credibility in the Pacific 
Rim and helped strengthen China by limiting U.S. influence.270  
Trump’s turn from innovation nationalism can also be seen with the 
trade dispute with China. Although China has made considerable progress 
in combatting infringement, Chinese firms continues to infringe U.S. IP 
rights.271 Under Article 23.1 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), WTO members are obligated to redress WTO 
violations “only by recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU, and not 
through unilateral action.”272 As a WTO panel observed, “unilateral actions 
threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system,” and 
are “contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO.”273 
The United States is bound by Article 23.1 under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement, which was adopted by Congress to implement the WTO 
Agreements.274  
Instead of filing a WTO complaint and awaiting a ruling, Trump started 
a trade war. He had the USTR initiate an investigation under the antiquated 
§ 301 of the Trade Act, which concluded that China had committed several 
IP-related offenses.275 On June 20, 2018, the USTR imposed $34 billion 
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worth of tariffs on China, which in turn retaliated with an equal amount of 
tariffs on U.S. goods.276 Since that time, the United States has escalated with 
additional tariffs that China promptly matched.277 China has also filed two 
complaints with the WTO over the tariffs, challenging the plan for $200 
billion worth of tariffs.278  
The aggressive tactics of the United States relate to nationalism and 
national identity. Trump’s remarks regarding China were filled with nativist 
rhetoric, linking the protection of patents and other IP to “our security and 
our prosperity.”279 He stated: “We will uphold our values, we will defend 
our workers, and we will protect the innovations, creations, and inventions 
that power our magnificent country.”280 Through this trade war, Trump has 
reinforced the victimization narrative of foreigners trying to harm 
Americans, maintaining that it is his “duty and responsibility” to protect the 
public “from unfair and abusive actions,” and promising to “protect 
forgotten Americans who have been left behind by a global trade system.”281 
Consequently, Trump has prioritized supporting an identity in which the 
United States is portrayed as an island of strength that does not need to 
cooperate with any foreign powers, including its allies, notwithstanding the 
harm to innovation and the U.S. economy.   
CONCLUSION 
Patents and economic nationalism go hand-in-hand. Whether a country 
views itself as cosmopolitan and innovative or nativist and culturally 
traditionalist, patent policy can be used to implement a nationalistic agenda. 
For many years, U.S. government officials helped cultivate innovation 
nationalism as part of the country’s national identity and implemented 
policies that reinforced it. Domestic patent rights were expanded through the 
Patent Act to benefit key industries, with the general public paying the cost. 
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U.S.-based industries were favored by being able to use the ITC to obtain 
exclusion orders against infringing imports. U.S.-style patent protection was 
then pushed onto others through trade agreements and threats of sanctions, 
despite the lack of benefit for developing countries. Although many of these 
acts were not overtly protectionist, they were nevertheless examples of 
economic nationalism, with economic policies being used to promote an 
innovative identity. 
But under the Trump administration, innovation nationalism has come 
into conflict with nativism and cultural traditionalism. Trump has eschewed 
cooperation with other countries, even though trade agreements frequently 
benefit patent rights holders. Instead, his “America First” policies have 
relied on unilateral mechanisms, such as tariffs and trade wars. In adopting 
these policies, Trump has attempted to promote the United States as a strong, 
sovereign nation that will swiftly retaliate against its enemies, regardless of 
the cost to innovation and harm to the U.S. economy.  
Looking at patent and IP policy from a nationalistic lens highlights a 
problem for those attempting to argue against misguided policies: 
nationalism is often not rational. Economists have struggled since the 1930s 
to convince the government that protectionist trade policies are detrimental 
to the economy. Likewise, IP scholars have failed on numerous occasions to 
prevent the government from senselessly expanding patent and copyright 
law for the benefit of a few interest groups. To overcome this, scholars may 
need to speak the same nationalistic language that the government 
understands.  
